The Bhotekoshi disaster should become a turning point for Nepal’s climate diplomacy. The scale of destruction exposes vulnerabilities across Nepal’s mountain economy. Mountain hazards increasingly threaten lives, infrastructure, livelihoods and development gains. Avalanches, landslides, floods and glacial events can cascade downstream.
Their precise causes must be established through rigorous scientific investigation. Geology, rainfall, glaciers, permafrost, earthquakes, rivers and construction can interact in complex ways. Climate change can intensify some hazards, but not every disaster. Nepal therefore needs evidence, attribution, preparedness and stronger reconstruction standards. Rebuilding damaged assets exactly as before would be strategically inadequate. The country must rebuild for a more hazardous climate.
That requires international finance, technology, scientific cooperation and diplomatic engagement. Nepal’s climate diplomacy should therefore extend beyond demands for compensation. Compensation remains an important question of climate justice and responsibility. Yet compensation alone cannot provide predictable, immediate or adequate support. The international system lacks a simple, enforceable compensation mechanism. Questions of attribution, responsibility, valuation and liability remain politically difficult.
Nepal should therefore convert justice claims into practical diplomatic objectives. The goal should be accessible grants, finance, technology and expertise. These resources should support preparedness, recovery, reconstruction and long-term resilience. Climate justice must produce capacity, not merely political declarations.
Nepal has a compelling climate-justice argument before the international community. Its greenhouse-gas contribution remains negligible compared with those of major emitters. Yet its exposure to climate-related hazards is exceptionally high. Mountain communities face floods, landslides, avalanches, droughts and ecosystem changes. Infrastructure losses can erase years of development within hours. Livelihood losses can deepen poverty and increase migration pressures. Climate impacts can also threaten cultural heritage and ecosystems.
Nepal should document these losses systematically and scientifically after disasters. Evidence will strengthen negotiations over finance and loss and damage. It will also prevent exaggerated claims from weakening Nepal’s credibility internationally. Precision should therefore become a central principle of climate diplomacy.
The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) should become central to this strategy. The FRLD was established to support vulnerable developing countries facing loss and damage. Its scope includes economic and non-economic losses. Nepal should build a permanent national pipeline for FRLD requests rather than beginning documentation only after disasters occur.
A dedicated technical mechanism should rapidly record deaths and displacement and document livelihood, agricultural, livestock, infrastructure and ecosystem losses. Cultural heritage and relocation requirements should also receive systematic attention. Reconstruction costs should distinguish immediate recovery from longer-term resilience investments.
Nepal should advocate accessible, grant-based support for vulnerable mountain countries. Mountain-specific procedures would make the mechanism more responsive and equitable.
Nepal should also use its Least Developed Country (LDC) status strategically. The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) provides important adaptation-financing opportunities. Nepal should target resources toward investments that lack commercial financing.
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Priority areas should include high-altitude hazard monitoring and surveillance. Glacier, landslide, watershed and river systems require stronger observation. Climate-resilient rural roads should receive greater adaptation attention. Agriculture and water systems also need investments that reduce vulnerability. Community-based early-warning systems should connect technology with local preparedness.
LDCF resources should therefore reduce future losses before disasters occur. Nepal’s LDC status is more than a statistical classification. It should function as a practical channel for resilience-building.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) should become Nepal’s principal long-term platform. Nepal already has several GCF-supported climate resilience and adaptation projects, including interventions related to glacial lakes and floods. However, Nepal needs a coherent national portfolio rather than isolated projects.
Future programmes should address climate-resilient hydropower and mountain connectivity. Early-warning systems, resilient settlements, agriculture and water security matter equally. Forest ecosystems and climate-smart urban development should receive stronger attention.
Nepal should also strengthen national institutions responsible for managing and accessing climate finance. Direct-access capacity can reduce excessive dependence on external intermediaries. Stronger domestic systems would improve ownership, implementation and accountability.
The World Bank can provide another layer of disaster financing. Its Crisis Response Window supports eligible countries after severe crises. Nepal should establish procedures enabling rapid post-disaster financing requests. Damage assessments and government proposals should be prepared immediately.
Crisis financing should complement, rather than replace, climate grants. Nepal should pursue a layered financing architecture for major disasters. This could combine FRLD, LDCF, GCF, World Bank resources and bilateral assistance. Domestic resources would remain necessary for core national responsibilities. Nepal should also explore contingent financing and disaster-risk instruments. Pre-arranged financing can reduce delays when catastrophic events occur.
Regional diplomacy offers another opportunity through BIMSTEC cooperation. Mountain hazards rarely remain confined within administrative or national boundaries. Rivers carry upstream disturbances toward downstream communities and infrastructure.
Nepal should propose a Mountain and River Disaster Resilience Initiative. The initiative could connect Himalayan hazards with Bay of Bengal risks. It should promote satellite-data sharing and hydrometeorological information exchange. Regional flood and landslide warning systems could save lives. Joint exercises would improve emergency preparedness and response coordination. Shared river-basin risk mapping could strengthen infrastructure planning.
Scientific cooperation could also improve understanding of cascading mountain hazards. Nepal could thereby transform geographical vulnerability into regional diplomatic leadership.
The Santiago Network should become Nepal’s technical bridge to the international system. Its purpose is to provide technical assistance rather than direct compensation. It connects vulnerable countries with organisations, experts and relevant expertise.
Nepal should use this mechanism more systematically and ambitiously. Its identified needs already include glacier forecasting and disaster alerts. Risk mapping, vulnerability assessment, rescue, rehabilitation and loss assessment matter too. Nepal should consolidate these requirements into one integrated national request.
A Himalayan Loss and Damage Assessment System could be developed. It should combine satellite imagery, drones, seismic instruments and weather stations. River gauges, glacier sensors and community observations should complement these technologies.
An effective early-warning system must trigger action before disaster strikes. Monitoring alone does not protect communities unless warnings lead to decisions. Authorities need predetermined procedures for evacuation and emergency mobilisation. Roads may require closure when dangerous conditions are detected. Vulnerable infrastructure may require temporary suspension or controlled operation.
Communities need accessible warnings through trusted local communication channels. Local governments should know their responsibilities before emergencies begin. Nepal should therefore move from early warning toward anticipatory action. The test should be lives protected, not sensors installed.
Technology must serve communities rather than become another Kathmandu-centered project. Preparedness should ultimately be measured by avoided deaths and losses.
Nepal also needs stronger climate-risk standards for reconstruction. Rebuilding cannot simply restore infrastructure to its previous condition. Roads repeatedly damaged by unstable slopes require different alignments. Settlements in extreme-risk locations may require relocation or redesign. Bridges and hydropower facilities need updated hazard assumptions.
Historical rainfall records alone may no longer provide sufficient guidance. Geological conditions, drainage, erosion and future climate risks also matter. Environmental assessment should influence decisions before projects receive approval. Disaster-risk reduction should become part of mainstream development planning.
Reconstruction should follow the principle of building back better. Otherwise, international recovery finance may reproduce tomorrow’s disaster vulnerabilities.
International climate diplomacy must also connect with local resilience. Communities should not remain passive recipients of international climate finance. Farmers, women, Indigenous communities, municipalities and vulnerable households need agency.
Community programmes can combine resilient agriculture with livelihood diversification. Watershed restoration can reduce hazards while supporting local economic opportunities. Local early-warning systems can connect scientific information with practical action.
International finance should therefore reach communities through accountable national systems. The country needs resilient infrastructure and resilient people simultaneously. A stronger bridge matters, but so does an informed community. Climate finance succeeds when investments reduce vulnerability where people actually live.
Nepal should now establish a National Climate Finance Coordination Platform. It should bring together finance, environment, disaster-management and planning institutions. Provincial and local governments should also have defined roles. Scientific institutions and development partners should participate where appropriate.
The platform should match each risk with suitable financing mechanisms. FRLD should address loss and damage after climate-related disasters. LDCF should support adaptation consistent with Nepal’s LDC position. GCF should finance transformational, long-term resilience investments. World Bank instruments should strengthen rapid crisis and risk financing. Santiago Network assistance should address technical gaps and institutional capacity. BIMSTEC should strengthen regional science, preparedness and cooperation.
Nepal should take this integrated strategy to international negotiations. Prime Minister Balendra Shah should use UN forums to present a stronger proposition to international partners. His message should move beyond asking who will compensate Nepal.
Nepal did not create the climate crisis, but it remains committed to solutions. It needs finance, technology, scientific knowledge and meaningful international cooperation. That position combines climate justice with responsibility and practical action.
Justice must connect with finance, science, preparedness and regional cooperation. Nepal cannot prevent every mountain disaster or eliminate every risk. But it can ensure that the next disaster does not become an equally devastating development catastrophe.
Climate justice should ultimately mean the capacity to survive, recover and build differently.
(The author is a former Member of Parliament from Lalitpur.)
